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Who Says Human Rights are Not Respected?
Assessing Local and Third Party Ratings
Rob Clark
University of Oklahoma

ABSTRACT
Country ratings of human rights conditions are now quite popular in macro comparative
research. However, little is known as to whether (or to what extent) these scores correspond with
mass sentiment in each country. Do local ratings issued by the public correspond with third party
ratings, such as those produced by the Cingranelli-Richards index (CIRI), the Political Terror
Scale (PTS), and Freedom House (FH)? In this study, I address this question, drawing from the
most recent wave of the World Values Survey (2010 – 2014), in which respondents from 59
countries are asked to assess the level of respect for individual human rights in their country. The
findings generally suggest a positive association between local and third party ratings, and that
local raters appear to be particularly responsive to the most severe violations of physical integrity
rights. CIRI’s torture scale, PTS, and Fariss’ event-based measure (emphasizing the most
extreme forms of repression) explain more of the between-country variation in local ratings than
any of the other third party ratings analyzed. Nevertheless, there is also significant variation in
human rights ratings within countries. In particular, survey respondents who are male, wealthy,
politically conservative, and citizens offer significantly higher ratings than other individuals.
Thus, while these results highlight between-country differences in human rights conditions, the
local ratings illustrate the wide range of opinions that exist within countries.
Keywords: Attitudes, Globalization, Human Rights, World Polity

Introduction
The use of country ratings by scholars to model human rights conditions is popular in
contemporary macro comparative research. Third party ratings (e.g., Cingranelli-Richards Index,
Political Terror Scale) assess political regimes all over the world with respect to their violations
of physical integrity rights and civil liberties. The ratings themselves now enjoy considerable
legitimacy and serve as crucial arbiters in objectively describing human rights conditions as they
exist on the ground. Armed with these ratings, scholars are now presumably able to determine
(1) whether human rights conditions are improving over time, and (2) what factors significantly
influence state repression.
An analysis of country ratings suggests that human rights conditions are not improving
(Clark 2010, 2014; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), an idea which has practically become
conventional wisdom. However, this is somewhat surprising given that human rights treaties
have grown increasingly popular in recent decades and have proliferated across the world (Clark
2010; Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Pegram 2010), signaling a growing effort by
the international community to address human rights violations (Hafner-Burton 2008).
Accordingly, some now argue that third party ratings may suffer from “information effects”
1
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(Clark and Sikkink 2013; Fariss 2014), suggesting that the implementation of human rights
reforms in some countries may be masked by rising global standards.
With the assistance of third party ratings, human rights scholars are also able to speak
confidently about what factors affect state repression. Past studies identify a number of statelevel characteristics that improve a country’s human rights performance, including economic
development (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Poe and Tate 1994), democracy (Clark and
Hall 2011; Powell and Staton 2009), and ties to international organizations (Greenhill 2010;
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Powell and Staton 2009), along with conditions that lead to
human rights violations, such as civil war (Clark 2012; Clark and Hall 2011; Hafner-Burton and
Tsutsui 2005, 2007) and population pressures (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Powell
and Staton 2009). Interestingly, the role of human rights treaties in stopping (or perhaps
triggering) state repression represents one of the more significant debates in the human rights
literature (Cole 2012a, 2012b; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002).
According to third party ratings, human rights conditions remain diverse across the world
(Clark 2014). The Political Terror Scale (PTS) rates countries on their level of state repression,
with scores ranging from 1 to 5 (I discuss this measure in greater detail below). While countries
like Sweden feature very low levels of repression according to this measure, other countries like
Pakistan rate very high at the other end of the continuum. Presumably, then, those individuals
residing in Sweden and Pakistan live in very different circumstances. The relative presence or
absence of human rights violations (e.g., torture, political imprisonment) can be experienced
directly or learned indirectly through family, neighbors, and friends. Citizens can also avail
themselves to media reports, press releases from human rights groups, or the publications of
other watchdog organizations. Thus, ideally, each population is in a position to evaluate the
performance of their government. An important question, then, is to what extent do third party
ratings correspond with the opinions of those who actually live in these countries? By comparing
local attitudes with ratings that are produced by human rights groups, we are in a better position
to evaluate whether the reliance on third party ratings by human rights scholars is warranted, and
whether the conclusions we draw from our use of these ratings are accurate.
In addition, such an exercise affords us the opportunity to examine variation in opinion
among the local raters themselves. Mass sentiment may not be coherent, and individuals living in
the same country may form very different impressions depending on a number of factors,
including their definition of human rights (i.e., which rights are under consideration?), the
standards they use to assess government performance (i.e., what rises to the level of a
violation?), their access to information, their proximity to victimization, and perhaps their level
of patriotism and loyalty to the state.
In this study, I address two research questions surrounding the local ratings of human
rights conditions: (1) to what extent do the public’s ratings correspond with the ratings provided
by human rights groups?, and (2) to what extent do local ratings vary within each population?
And, in addressing both questions, a third naturally arises. Are local ratings influenced by the
personal characteristics of the individual (e.g., age, gender, income) net of objective conditions?
To address these questions, I rely on survey data from the most recent wave (2010 – 2014) of the
World Values Survey (WVS). In this survey wave, respondents from 59 countries were asked
how much respect there is for individual human rights in their country. Four responses are
available, including “There is no respect at all” (a score of 1), “There is not much respect” (a
score of 2), “There is some respect” (a score of 3), and “There is a lot of respect” (a score of 4).
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As Figure 1 reveals, the attitudes of respondents vary considerably. Figure 1 presents four
box plots (one for each response category), with each box plot depicting a frequency distribution
of the percent of respondents selecting that category across all 59 states. In very few cases did a
large majority of the respondents agree on the same rating. And, in most cases (34 out of 59
countries), none of the ratings were even selected by a simple majority. On average, 10.6% of
respondents selected the lowest rating, 15.5% selected the highest rating, while the remaining
respondents selected one of the two middle categories (30.9% and 43.0%, respectively). Overall,
in 50 of the 59 countries, three of the four response categories were selected by at least 10% of
the survey respondents. Thus, in most countries, sizeable portions of the sample expressed
markedly different opinions as to the human rights conditions in that state.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Survey Responses

Note: Survey responses refer to the following item in the 2010 – 2014 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS),
“How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in your country?” Responses include (1) “There
is no respect at all,” (2) “There is not much respect,” (3) “There is some respect,” and (4) “There is a lot of respect.”
The distribution of survey responses are shown across the four response categories (N = 59).

Nevertheless, when averaging these responses at the country level, do the local ratings
offered by respondents correspond with third party ratings? According to Figure 2, this does not
appear to be the case. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of survey responses by three categories of
states, as classified by PTS in 2010. Countries with PTS scores of 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 (i.e., low
levels of respect for human rights) appear on the left, countries with scores of 2.5, 3.0, and 3.5
appear in the middle, and countries with scores of 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0 (i.e., high levels of respect for
human rights) appear on the right. Several patterns stand out. First, the distribution of survey
responses across categories looks fairly similar. In particular, survey respondents in the most
repressive states (PTS scores of 1.0 – 2.0) provide quite similar ratings to those living in
moderately repressive states (PTS scores of 2.5 – 3.5). On the other hand, respondents in the
3
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least repressive states (PTS scores of 4.0 – 5.0) do appear to provide more favorable ratings, as
indicated by smaller percentages in the bottom two categories (“no respect” and “not much
respect”) and higher percentages in the top two categories (“some respect” and “a lot of
respect”). Ultimately, though, regardless of a state’s actual human rights record, “some respect”
appears to be the most popular choice for survey respondents, followed by “not much respect,”
with the two extreme ratings (“no respect” and “a lot of respect”) selected least often. Overall,
the correlation between a country’s local rating (i.e., that country’s average WVS score) and its
third party rating (i.e., that country’s PTS score) is positive, but mild (r = .256). Thus, it appears
that there is as much, if not more, variation in the ratings offered by survey respondents within
countries as there is between them, suggesting that an individual’s vantage point may be
influenced by more than just objective conditions.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Survey Responses by Political Terror Scale (PTS)
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PTS (2.5-3.5)

PTS (4.0-5.0)

Note: Survey responses refer to the following item in the 2010 – 2014 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS),
“How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in your country?” Responses include (1) “There
is no respect at all,” (2) “There is not much respect,” (3) “There is some respect,” and (4) “There is a lot of respect.”
The distribution of survey responses are shown for different categories of states classified by the Political Terror
Scale (PTS) in 2010. Countries with PTS scores of 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 appear on the left, countries with scores of 2.5,
3.0, and 3.5 appear in the middle, and countries with scores of 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0 appear on the right (N = 58).

In sum, the survey respondents generally do not provide a coherent image of human
rights conditions in their country, nor are their evaluations necessarily consistent with the
country ratings offered by PTS. In the following analyses, I examine what factors influence the
human rights ratings of survey respondents, including an individual’s gender, income, education,
newspaper consumption, political ideology, citizenship, age, and marital status, along with
country level predictors that capture levels of economic development and ties to the international
community. If personal characteristics shape one’s personal evaluation of human rights
conditions, then perhaps the lack of correspondence between local and third party ratings is a
function of sample differences regarding those characteristics that are particularly influential.
4
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Consequently, once controlling for these characteristics, perhaps the mild, positive association
between local and third party ratings will strengthen.
Data
DEPENDENT VARIABLE. Local Human Rights Rating. Ratings come from the following
item of the WVS (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp), “How much respect is there for
individual human rights nowadays in your country?” Responses include (1) “There is no respect
at all,” (2) “There is not much respect,” (3) “There is some respect,” and (4) “There is a lot of
respect for human rights.” I reverse-coded the original scores so that higher values indicate a
more positive rating. In this analysis, I restrict attention to the sixth wave of the WVS (2010 –
2014).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. Micro-Level Predictors. I examine a set of micro-level
variables from the WVS, including Gender (female = 1), Income Scale (1 – 10), Education Level
(1 – 3), Newspaper Consumption (never = 1; daily = 5), Political Ideology (left = 1; right = 10),
Citizenship (citizen = 1), Age (16 – 99), and Marital Status (reference = married/cohabiting).
Given that there is considerable variation in the local human rights ratings of each country, it is
possible that these personal characteristics play a role in shaping the diversity of perceptions
towards human rights conditions.
Macro-Level Predictors. All macro-level variables are measured at 2010, coinciding with
the first year of the 2010 – 2014 wave of the WVS. Third Party Human Rights Ratings. I use
several third party ratings, including the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke,
and Arnon 2015) and the Cingranelli-Richards Index (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014),
both of which are high-profile measures of a state’s human rights practices. The CingranelliRichards Index is “widely used by governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, think-tanks, and private businesses” (Cingranelli and Richards
2010: 404), and the Political Terror Scale is the “most commonly used indicator of state
violations of citizens’ physical integrity rights” (Wood and Gibney 2010: 368). The two
measures examine very similar forms of state repression, and both sets of ratings are based on
annual reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department.
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) indicates the extent to which the state engages in acts of
repression, including political murder, extrajudicial killings, torture, beatings, physical abuse,
disappearances, as well as political imprisonment and detention without trial. Countries are
placed in one of five categories, depending on how extensive the repression is, ranging from rare
(1) to unlimited (5). Separate scores are produced for each data source (i.e., Amnesty
International and the U.S. State Department). I calculated the average of these two scores and
inverted this value, thereby creating a nine-point scale, ranging from 1 (repression is unlimited)
to 5 (repression is rare). The Cingranelli-Richards Index (CIRI) measures a country’s respect for
“physical integrity rights,” based on four distinct categories: forced disappearances, extrajudicial
killings, political imprisonment, and torture. Countries are given a score of 0 (no government
respect for right) to 2 (full government respect for right) for each of the four categories. Thus, the
aggregated physical integrity rights score ranges from 0 (no respect for any right) to 8 (full
respect for all rights). In addition to estimating the aggregated score, I also examine the effect of
each category to investigate whether local ratings correspond with any particular type of human
rights violation.
However, there is now growing concern that PTS and CIRI ratings may be plagued by
“information effects” resulting from improved and/or more aggressive reporting of human rights
5
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violations (Clark and Sikkink 2013; Fariss 2014). Annual reports from Amnesty International
and the U.S. State Department are now longer, cover more categories of human rights violations,
and feature expanded definitions of what constitutes a violation (Clark and Sikkink 2013),
thereby affecting the comparability of country ratings over time. Fariss (2014) argues that human
rights ratings are biased because (1) the quality and quantity of information has improved, (2)
human rights groups have greater access to evidence, and (3) monitoring agencies have
broadened their focus. In sum, “the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International look
harder for abuse, look in more places for abuse, and classify more acts as abuse” (Fariss 2014:
300). Consequently, a country’s human rights rating may worsen over time, even if its practices
have actually improved. Indeed, despite the institutionalization of human rights norms across the
world, several studies report that human rights ratings have remained stagnant, or even declined
slightly in recent years (Cingranelli and Richards 2010; Clark 2010; Cole 2012a; Fariss 2014;
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).
To address changing standards in the existing ratings, Fariss (2014) generates unbiased
estimates of repression using four standards-based human rights measures (including CIRI and
PTS), along with five event-based measures. Unlike the standards-based measures, the eventbased measures are updated as new information becomes available, which enhances longitudinal
comparability. Also, the event-based measures tend to focus on the “extreme end of the
repression spectrum” (Fariss 2014:301), including mass repression, genocide, politicide,
government killing, and political executions. As Fariss (2014:304) explains, because the eventbased measures are periodically updated and reflect the most visible forms of repression, they are
a “valid representation of historical record to date,” and can therefore serve as a baseline by
which to compare the standards-based measures. Fariss then generates latent variable estimates
based on a dynamic standard model (in which the probability of a country being coded at a
certain level among the standards-based measures is adjusted to reflect rising standards). The
model produces estimates that suggest violations have declined notably since the 1980s. I use
these estimates to serve as a third human rights indicator, and one that will account for changing
standards in human rights practices.
I also include two popular measures of democracy to assess whether local raters consider
political rights, civil liberties, and/or the quality of their political institutions when evaluating
human rights. Democracy ratings come from Freedom House (Freedom House 2016) and Polity
IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014), which represent the two “most commonly used indicators
of democracy” (Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008:645). Freedom House’s annual survey
measures democracy according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties.
Political rights take into consideration the electoral process (e.g., free and fair elections), political
pluralism and participation (e.g., inclusiveness in the political process), and the functioning of
government (e.g., corruption and transparency). Civil liberties take into account freedom of
expression (e.g., press freedom, academic freedom, religious freedom), organizational rights
(e.g., freedom of assembly, labor rights), rule of law (independent judiciary, civilian control over
police, political repression), and individual rights (private property rights, gender equity, equal
economic opportunity). Each country is rated on a seven-point scale in both categories, with 1
representing the most free, and 7 representing the least free. I calculated the average of these two
categories for each country and inverted this value so that higher numbers represent greater
levels of democracy, thereby creating a 13-point scale, ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high). In
addition to estimating the aggregated score, I also examine the effect of each category to
investigate whether local ratings correspond more with political rights or civil liberties. Polity IV
6
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ratings restrict attention to a narrower range of criteria (political participation, executive
recruitment, and constraints on executive authority). Separate scores are first constructed that
reflect a state’s level of “institutionalized democracy” (ranging from 0 to 10) and
“institutionalized autocracy” (ranging from 0 to 10). The latter is then subtracted from the former
to produce each country’s final rating, with scores that range from -10 (low) to 10 (high).
Finally, I include two macro-level predictors that control for each country’s level of
economic development, as well as its organizational embeddedness in the international
community. GDP PC (PPP) (log). Gross domestic product per capita (GDP PC) is converted to
2011 international dollars using purchasing power parity rates (PPP). An international dollar has
the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. Data come
from the World Bank’s (2016) World Development Indicators. IGO Ties. International
governmental organization (IGO) ties refer to the number of IGOs to which each country
belongs, listed in the Union of International Association’s Yearbook of International
Organizations. Data come from Cole and Ramirez (2013).
SAMPLE. In the sixth wave of the WVS (2010 – 2014), 82,718 individuals across 59
countries provide a human rights rating for their country. The countries represent most every
geographic region in the world, including Northern Europe (Estonia, Sweden), Southern Europe
(Slovenia, Spain), Eastern Europe (Belarus, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine), Western Europe
(Germany, Netherlands), Central America (Mexico), North America (United States), South
America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay), the Caribbean
(Trinidad-Tobago), North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia), South Africa (South
Africa), East Africa (Rwanda, Zimbabwe), West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria), Central Asia
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan), South Asia (India, Pakistan), South-East Asia (Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand), East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), West Asia
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine,
Qatar, Turkey, Yemen), and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand). These cases form the basis for
the descriptive analyses (see Figures 1 – 3), except for Hong Kong, which does not feature a
human rights rating from PTS. In the regression models (see Tables 1 and 2), 48 countries are
included (N = 50,565), as missing data on the independent variables cause 11 countries to drop
out (respondents from Argentina, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Qatar,
Singapore, Spain, and Taiwan are excluded).
Results
Tables 1 and 2 report results from 12 multilevel mixed-effects ordered probit models of
local human rights ratings from WVS respondents during the sixth wave (2010 – 2014). All
models are fully specified, with the third party human rights rating varying across models,
beginning with model 2. Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient, with the standard error
in parentheses. Across all 12 models, the estimates for gender (p < .01), income (p < .001),
political ideology (p < .001), and citizenship (p < .01) are statistically significant, indicating that
wealthy and conservative male citizens report more favorable human rights ratings relative to
others. Overall, these findings are intuitive, given past work that links personal characteristics to
attitudes and dispositions that relate directly or indirectly to human rights. First, prior work
reveals that wealthier individuals tend to offer more favorable human rights ratings than the poor
(Clark and Hall 2011), presumably because of their greater distance from victimization. In
addition, authoritarianism is associated with adopting a right-wing ideology (Heaven and Bucci
2001; Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, and Sulloway 2003), which suggests that conservatives adopt a
7
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more permissive “law and order” attitude with respect to state repression. By contrast, given that
international migrants represent a category of victimized individuals (Bustamante 2002), it is not
surprising that non-citizens would offer more negative assessments of human rights practices in
their country of residence. Females and liberals are also more likely to frame torture as a
violation of human rights (Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp 2009), suggesting higher standards by
which to judge state behavior. Finally, past work shows a mild link between gender and national
pride (Smith and Kim 2006), indicating that males are more likely to identify with (rather than
critically assess) political elites.
Among the macro-level predictors, we are most interested in the performance of the third
party human rights ratings. In model 2, a country’s CIRI rating is not significantly related to its
local rating net of other factors. However, CIRI reports human rights ratings for several
categories, including forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and
torture. Thus, in the next four models, I examine whether one or more of these categories exhibit
stronger associations with the local ratings. The extent to which states participate in forced
disappearances or political imprisonment is not significantly associated with an individual’s
assessment of human rights in those countries. By contrast, survey respondents appear to be
more responsive to the two most severe forms of state repression, extrajudicial killings and
torture. The coefficient for extrajudicial killings falls just outside of marginal significance (b =
.204; p > .10), while the effect of torture (b = .315; p < .01) is much stronger. Thus, states that
respect physical integrity rights in these two categories receive notably higher human rights
ratings from the local population.
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Table 1. Multilevel Mixed-Effects Ordered Probit Models of Human Rights Rating (WVS)
Gender (Female = 1)
Income Scale (1 – 10)
Education Level (1 – 3)
Newspaper Consumption (Never = 1; Daily = 5)
Political Ideology (Left = 1; Right = 10)
Citizenship (Citizen = 1)
Agea

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.179
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.174
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.179
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.177
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.177
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.126**
(.041)
.171
(.383)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.062
(.088)
.001
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.177
(.111)
.001
(.006)
.064
(.040)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.049
(.103)
.001
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.156
(.103)
.001
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.095
(.101)
.001
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.153
(.087)
-.002
(.006)

Marital Status (Reference = Married/Cohabiting)
Divorced/Separated
Widowed
Single/Never Married
GDP PC (PPP) (log)
IGO Ties
CIRI
CIRI (Forced Disappearances)

-.024
(.107)

CIRI (Extrajudicial Killings)

.204
(.125)

CIRI (Political Imprisonment)

.062
(.096)

CIRI (Torture)
Level 1 N

50,565

50,565

50,565

50,565

50,565

.315**
(.113)
50,565

Level 2 N

48

48

48

48

48

48

Level 2 Variance Component

.223

.211

.222

.211

.221

.191

LR Test vs. Ordered Probit

7,639*** 7,145*** 7,619*** 7,263*** 7,593*** 6,452***

BIC

117,167

117,176

117,178

117,176

117,178

117,171

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
a
Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 103.
Note: Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient, with the standard error in parentheses.
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In model 7, a country’s PTS rating (p < .05) is positively associated with the ratings
provided by survey respondents. Thus, in contrast to what we see in Figure 2, once personal
characteristics are modeled out of the data, a positive and significant relationship between local
ratings and PTS ratings does emerge. In model 8, I replace the PTS ratings with human rights
scores from Fariss. Not surprisingly, the effect is relatively large (b = .181; p < .01), as this
measure focuses on the most extreme forms of repression. Thus, consistent with the CIRI
models, survey respondents in the WVS appear to be especially responsive to the most severe
human rights violations.
In the remaining models, I estimate the effect of third party democracy ratings to examine
whether local raters consider a wider range of regime characteristics. In models 9 – 11, I examine
the Freedom House ratings, including the overall rating, followed by the political rights rating
and the civil liberties rating. In each case, the effect is positive and statistically significant (p <
.05). Notice, however, that the civil liberties rating (b = .088) is larger than the political rights
rating (b = .070) and appears to drive the overall effect. This is not surprising, as civil liberties
are more closely related to conventional indicators of human rights than political rights. Finally,
in model 12, I find that the Polity IV effect is non-significant and close to zero, indicating that
institutional characteristics do not factor very heavily in human rights ratings of local
respondents.
Among the third party ratings examined in Tables 1 and 2, the CIRI torture rating, PTS,
and Fariss exert the strongest effects. These three measures explain more of the between-country
variation in local ratings than any other measure, as indicated by the reduction in the variance
component (as reported towards the bottom of each table). In other words, to the extent that the
attitudes of local raters vary from one country to the next (presumably because of differences in
objective conditions), these three measures capture that variation better than any of the others.
Finally, among the macro-level controls, I find that GDP PC is negatively associated with
local ratings. The measure is negatively signed in all 12 models, but only achieves statistical
significance in model 8 (p < .05), while reaching marginal significance in models 6 and 7 (p <
.10). Although it is difficult to be certain what is driving this negative association, a likely
explanation is that wealthier countries feature populations with higher standards regarding
matters of rights and liberties relative to the rest of the respondents in the sample. Thus, practices
that may be considered a human rights violation in a wealthier country may not be classified as
such in a less developed country.
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Table 2. Multilevel Mixed-Effects Ordered Probit Models of Human Rights Rating (WVS)
Gender (Female = 1)
Income Scale (1 – 10)
Education Level (1 – 3)
Newspaper Consumption (1 = Never; 5 = Daily)
Political Ideology (Left = 1; Right = 10)
Citizenship (Citizen = 1)
Agea

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10 Model 11 Model 12

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.171
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.126**
(.041)
.168
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.172
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.173
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.172
(.383)

-.026**
(.010)
.047***
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.005
(.003)
.032***
(.002)
.125**
(.041)
.177
(.383)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.190
(.099)
.002
(.006)
.161*
(.068)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.234*
(.099)
.002
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.121
(.089)
-.002
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.110
(.088)
-.002
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.130
(.091)
-.001
(.006)

-.039
(.020)
-.024
(.023)
-.013
(.013)
-.071
(.088)
.000
(.006)

Marital Status (Reference = Married/Cohabiting)
Divorced/Separated
Widowed
Single/Never Married
GDP PC (PPP) (log)
IGO Ties
PTS
Fariss

.181**
(.060)

Freedom House

.081*
(.040)

Freedom House (Political Rights)

.070*
(.036)

Freedom House (Civil Liberties)

.088*
(.044)

Polity IV
Level 1 N

50,565

50,565

50,565

50,565

50,565

.008
(.013)
50,565

Level 2 N

48

48

48

48

48

48

Level 2 Variance Component

.199

.187

.205

.206

.206

.221

LR Test vs. Ordered Probit

6,895*** 6,390*** 7,191*** 7,278*** 7,109*** 7,638***

BIC

117,173

117,170

117,174

117,174

117,174

117,178

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
a
Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 103.
Note: Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient, with the standard error in parentheses.
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Overall, the findings from Tables 1 and 2 suggest the importance of four personal
characteristics (gender, income, ideology, and citizenship) for shaping local human rights
ratings. Figure 3 and Table 3 also help illustrate this idea. Figure 3 presents a scatterplot of each
country’s average survey response (ranging from 1.0 to 4.0) by the amount of variation around
the average response, as indicated by the Gini (higher scores indicate greater dispersion around
the mean). The average rating is presented along the y-axis, while the variance is presented along
the x-axis. The two measures are negatively correlated (r = -.776), indicating that high averages
are associated with low variance. That is, countries where the average rating is relatively low
features greater dispersion around the mean. This is intuitive, as low averages will be brought
down by a disproportionately large number of low ratings, which will inflate the variance. Of
particular interest, though, are the 10 states marked by a dark circle (Egypt, Brazil, Palestine,
Russia, Mexico, India, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, China, and Philippines). Each of these states
received a PTS rating of 2.0 in 2010. However, the average ratings they receive from the survey
respondents (and the amount of dispersion occurring around these averages) vary widely. Could
the personal characteristics of the survey respondents be responsible for such notable differences
in the local ratings when the objective conditions are so similar, according to PTS?

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

PTS = 2.0

1.5

Human Rights Rating (Mean)

4.0

Figure 3. Survey Responses, Mean by Variance

.05

.10

.15

.20

.25

Human Rights Rating (Gini)

Note: Survey responses refer to the following item in the 2010 – 2014 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS),
“How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in your country?” Responses include (1) “There
is no respect at all,” (2) “There is not much respect,” (3) “There is some respect,” and (4) “There is a lot of respect.”
The plot shows each country’s average response by how much variation exists around the average response. Darkshaded circles refer to those 10 states with a score of 2.0 on the Political Terror Scale (PTS) in 2010, including
Egypt, Brazil, Palestine, Russia, Mexico, India, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, China, and Philippines (N = 59).

Table 3 addresses this question, reporting each country’s PTS rating (the third party
rating), WVS rating (the mean local rating), along with summary statistics describing each
country’s sample, including gender (the percent of females in the sample), income (the average
12
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol12/iss1/14

12

Clark: Who Says Human Rights are Not Respected? Assessing Local and Thir

score of survey respondents on the income scale), and ideology (the average score of respondents
on the political ideology scale). We do not include citizenship data here, as all samples are
overwhelmingly comprised of citizens. Thus, while citizenship may significantly affect one’s
rating of human rights conditions, there are too few non-citizens in these samples to significantly
alter the average local rating for any country.
Table 3 is sorted by each country’s average WVS rating, with the five countries rated
below 2.5 featured in the top panel, and the five countries rated above 2.5 featured in the bottom
panel. As the final three columns reveal, the two groups of countries can also be distinguished by
their respective sample compositions. The top panel features samples with a relatively high
percent of females (especially Egypt and Brazil), along with respondents who are relatively poor
and politically moderate. By contrast, the bottom panel features a higher percent of males
(especially India), along with respondents who are wealthier and slightly more conservative
(although India is a notable exception). It is not surprising, then, that the average local ratings
among the countries in the top panel are notably lower than that of the countries in the bottom
panel. Overall, these patterns seem to indicate that, in the absence of variation in the objective
conditions across these 10 countries, variation in local ratings among these countries is driven by
the gender, class, and ideological composition of their respective survey samples.
Table 3. Selected Characteristics of Respondents in 10 Countries with PTS Rating of 2.0
State
Egypt

PTS Rating
(2010)
2.0

WVS Rating
(Mean)
1.91

Gender
(Percent Female)
67.8 %

Income Scale
(Average)
4.27

Political Ideology
(Average)
6.25

Brazil

2.0

2.18

62.4 %

4.40

5.37

Palestine

2.0

2.36

51.2 %

4.74

5.97

Russia

2.0

2.37

55.4 %

4.21

5.42

Mexico

2.0

2.49

50.1 %

3.32

6.25

Mean

2.0

2.26

57.4 %

4.19

5.85

India

2.0

2.74

37.7 %

4.51

4.97

Kyrgyzstan

2.0

2.90

50.9 %

5.56

6.55

Thailand

2.0

2.90

47.7 %

4.63

5.94

China

2.0

3.02

51.0 %

4.42

-----

Philippines

2.0

3.25

50.0 %

4.19

6.75

Mean

2.0

2.96

47.5 %

4.66

6.05

Note: PTS ratings range from 1.0 (low) to 5.0 (high). WVS ratings range from 1.0 (low) to 4.0 (high). Gender refers
to the percent of respondents in each country who are female. Income scale refers to the average income level of
respondents in each country, ranging from 1 (low) to 10 (high). Political ideology refers to the average ideological
position of respondents in each country, ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). Political ideology question not asked in
China.

Discussion
In this study, I examine local human rights ratings from 82,718 survey respondents across
59 countries representing every region of the world. The survey responses indicate considerable
disagreement as to the human rights conditions in each country and suggest that personal
characteristics are particularly relevant for shaping how individuals define human rights
13
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violations. In particular, wealthy and conservative male citizens tend to inflate human rights
ratings in their country relative to what would be expected given the third party ratings included
in these models. Of course, those who are poor, liberal, female, and/or migrants tend to evaluate
their governments more critically than what is expected. Likewise, respondents living in more
economically developed nations tend to express more negative sentiments.
Most importantly, though, once the relevant personal characteristics are modeled out of
the data, third party ratings tend to be positively and significantly associated with the local
ratings generated from the WVS survey respondents. In particular, while the overall CIRI rating
is not significantly associated with local ratings, CIRI’s torture rating is strongly associated with
the survey responses. Likewise, the PTS and Fariss ratings perform well, as do the Freedom
House ratings for political rights and civil liberties. Ultimately, then, these positive associations
lend credibility to third party ratings, as they generally correspond with evaluations produced by
the general population.
Future work may wish to examine the extent to which the local ratings produced by the
WVS can serve as a viable measure of objective human rights conditions. A critical step in this
process will surely be to develop a method for adjusting each country’s ratings by the personal
characteristics of the survey respondents. Nevertheless, the results from this study suggest that
such a project holds promise. In addition, future work should also consider building on the
present study by incorporating a longitudinal component into an analysis of local and third party
ratings. That is, do changes in third party assessments correspond with changes in mass
sentiment regarding human rights conditions? Such an analysis would be protected from the
confounding effects of time-invariant personal characteristics, but would certainly be limited by
the lack of available data across multiple waves of the WVS. Finally, a study that replicates the
present analysis using other forms of evaluation (e.g., assessment of political systems, estimates
of bribery and corruption) would be interesting in order to compare responses from the general
public to reports of objective conditions from various projects (e.g., Polity IV, Corruption
Perceptions Index). Popular assessments of how democracy is functioning within a given
country, as well as perceptions of corruption levels are important for gauging public sentiment
on the quality and transparency of institutions. Ultimately, while it is important to determine
whether states are respecting human rights and democratic principles, it is likewise important to
ascertain whether the public is generally aware of how its government behaves.
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